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Abstract
The vehicular connectivity revolution is fueling the automotive industry’s most significant
transformation seen in decades. However, as modern vehicles become more connected, they also
become much more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In this paper, a fully working machine learning
approach is proposed to protect connected vehicles (fleets and individuals) against such attacks.
We present a system that monitors different vehicle’s interfaces (Network, CAN and OS), extracts
relevant information based on configurable rules and sends it to a trained generative model to
detect deviations from normal behavior. Using configurable data collector, we provide a higher
level of data abstraction as the model is trained based on events instead of raw data, which has
a noise-filtering effect and eliminates the need to retrain the model whenever a protocol changes.
We present a new approach for detecting anomalies, tailored to the temporal nature of our domain.
Adapting the hybrid approach of Gutflaish et al. (2017) to the fully temporal setting, we first train
a Hidden Markov Model to learn normal vehicle behavior, and then a regression model to calibrate
the likelihood threshold for anomaly. Using this architecture, our method detects sophisticated and
realistic anomalies, which are missed by other existing methods monitoring the CAN bus only.
We also demonstrate the superiority of adaptive thresholds over static ones. Furthermore, our
approach scales efficiently from monitoring individual cars to serving large fleets. We demonstrate
the competitive advantage of our model via encouraging empirical results.
Index Terms
Anomaly Detection, Connected Cars, Hidden Markov Models, Intrusion Detection, Linear
Regression, Vehicle Cyber Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, we have been witnessing a continual transformation of the automotive
industry, whereby new technologies are integrated into the vehicles, changing the traditional
concept as we know it and improving safety, performance and efficiency.
However, as vehicles become more connected, they also become more vulnerable to remote
cyber-attacks, as researchers have recently been pointing out. Koscher et al. [1] demonstrated
how, in cases where it is possible to compromise car’s internal network, it becomes possible to
control a wide range of essential functions: disabling the brakes, selectively braking individual
wheels, stopping the engine, etc. Following the publication of [2], [3], which detailed a Jeep
Cherokee being remotely hacked and stopped on a highway, Chrysler issued a recall for 1.4
million vehicles. Checkoway et al. [4] presented a remote exploitation technique using different
attack vectors (e.g., Bluetooth and cellular), which enabled a remote takeover of the vehicle as
well as access to the acoustics inside the cabin and the vehicle’s location. Another team managed
to hack the wireless interface of the Tire Pressure Monitoring System and use it for eavesdropping
and tracking the vehicle [5]. Further research has shown that the Passive Keyless Entry and Engine
Start-Up system can also be hacked [6].
Protecting modern vehicles is a challenging task due to three main reasons: complexity, con-
nectivity (large attack surface) and legacy (unsafe and outdated technologies).
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In [7], it was estimated that a premium-class automobile contains over 100 million lines of
code that is executed on 70-100 Electronic Control Units (ECUs), and this number is projected to
grow to 200-300 million lines of code in the near future. This mean that such vehicles are highly
complex machines with many potential vulnerabilities caused by either wrong integration or by
human error.
The connectivity revolution makes it possible for modern vehicles to become connected through
a wide range of network interfaces, e.g., Wi-Fi, Cellular, Dedicated Short Range Communication
(DSRC), etc. This connectivity allows manufacturers to send Over-the-Air (OTA) updates, receive
diagnostic information and offer various media services. But, as the number of network interfaces
increases, so does the attack surface.
Modern vehicles are controlled and monitored by tens of Electronic Control Units that com-
municate over one or more internal network buses based on the unsecured Control Area Network
(CAN) protocol which has limited 1 Mbps bandwidth and a data field of 8 bytes. Since the CAN
packets have no source/destination identifier, the ECUs communicate by broadcasting packets on
the CAN bus, and each ECU decides whether the packet was intended for it.
Two main lines of defense suggested against such attacks are message authentication/encryption
and intrusion detection. The in-vehicle network’s nature makes it difficult to adopt message
authentication and/or encryption. Given the CAN protocol limitations, any cryptographic message
authentication would have too weak of a key to be useful. In [8], researchers suggested a delayed
authentication scheme that uses multiple CRC fields to compound 64 bits CBC-MAC (cipher
block chaining message authentication code). Another approach was to build a new protocol, CAN
flexible data-rate FD, which allows flexible data rates and longer payloads [9]. However, due to the
fact that messages must be broadcast at a high frequency, the encryption/authentication mechanisms
may lead to delays, which could impair vehicle’s safety. Moreover, authentication techniques for
the in-vehicle network would not necessarily prevent attackers from remotely attacking the car
and gaining access using its own network interfaces.
Hence, one is led to consider Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). However, rule-based IDSs are
fragile and cannot cover the full range of abnormal behavior. This shortcoming is mitigated by
machine learning anomaly detection systems. One complication is that the system must monitor
not only the CAN bus traffic, but rather the different vehicle’s interfaces (e.g., OS, Network and
CAN).
Our contribution consists of a novel approach that applies cross system monitoring, adapts data
abstraction and apply HMM to detect anomalies using new temporal detection technique. Due to
the connectivity revolution, attackers can attack the vehicle without leaving any trace on the CAN
bus. Therefore, monitoring the CAN bus traffic alone is not enough. We suggest to monitor the
vehicle’s main interfaces (e.g., OS, Network and CAN). By monitoring the different interfaces, we
can detect much more sophisticated and complex attacks which combine several attack vectors
from the different interfaces and does not necessarily include the CAN bus (e.g., an attacker
eavesdropping using a malicious application).
Additionally, we propose to train the model based on events generated from the raw data by
a rule based engine which monitors the different interfaces. By preprocessing the raw data into
events we provide a higher level of data abstraction, which eliminates the need to retrain the
model whenever a protocol is updated and helps filtering noise. Generating events will also be
effective when we will discuss the different implementation techniques in Section VI.
By modeling time-series data to state changes, we can detect anomalous changes in states which
can indicate abnormal behavior. Therefore, We suggest to train an Hidden Markov Model as a
normal behavior model Using events collected from the different interfaces. The actual anomaly
detection engine is inspired by [10], and adapted to our fully temporal setting.
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Our algorithms are trained on an abstraction of the raw data in the form of “events”. This
abstraction eliminates the need to retrain the model each time there are protocol updates. Addi-
tionally, it acts as a dimensionality reduction technique, helping reduce bandwidth demand and
filter out noise.
In Section VI we discuss the different techniques to implement our solution. We present the
hybrid approach we used, where a rule based client (data collector) is integrated into the vehicle
and sends events to the backend. This technique allows us to monitor car fleets, detect cross fleet
anomalies and identify correlations between different vehicles.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Frequency Based Techniques
Several researches suggested using the CAN packet frequency to detect abnormal activity on
the CAN bus. Due to the limited computational power in vehicles, Song et al. [11] proposed a
lightweight intrusion detection algorithm based on the fact that each message ID has a regular
frequency, and when attackers inject messages into the CAN bus, the message frequency changes
abruptly. In [12], Cho and Shin likewise relied on the fact that most in-vehicle network messages
are periodic and broadcast over CAN and suggested exploiting the time intervals of these periodic
messages as ECU fingerprints. These methods are mainly effective for periodic messages, so an
attacker who injects messages aperiodically may go undetected. Moreover, when the ECU is itself
the source of the malicious packets IDs, attacks may go undetected.
B. Statistical Techniques
Another approach to anomaly detection is to use statistical tools to construct a “normal” baseline
and then to identify deviations from the norm. One idea is an entropy-based model [13], [14].
researchers proposed entropy-based anomaly detection technique. In [13], the entropy of the in-
vehicle network was taken as the normal behavior baseline. The basic intuition is that due to
the clear and restrictive specification of the in-vehicle traffic, the entropy is relatively low and
therefore, attacks (e.g., changing packet payload, packet injection) would cause the entropy to
increase. Marchetti et al. [14] carried out an extensive experimental evaluation using hours of
real CAN data. Several limitations of entropy-based approaches were noted. In particular, in order
to detect low-volume attacks, one must build an anomaly detector for each message ID. Han et
al. [15] divided the data into four categories (Engine, Fuel, Gear and Wheel) and used one-way
ANOVA test to identify abnormal activity.
C. Machine Learning Techniques
Much work was done in the field of anomaly detection using machine learning techniques [16].
Given the scope of this paper, we restrict our attention to anomaly detection in vehicles and related
applications.
1) Classification Based Techniques: In the automotive context, Theissler [17] proposed using a
one-class SVM with the radial basis function (RBF) kernel to learn the baseline normal behavior,
and classify deviations as anomalies. The resulting classifier is applicable to sequences of events,
but does not detect point anomalies.
2) Clustering Based Techniques: In [18], Li et al. suggested to use Gaussian Mixture Model
(GMM)-based clustering to detect flights with abnormal patterns. The clusters are then Charac-
terized using their temporal distribution.
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3) Deep Learning Techniques: Several articles proposed anomaly detection using deep learning
in the automotive field [19], [20]. In [19], Kang and Kang suggested an intrusion detection system
(IDS) for in-vehicle networks based on Deep Neural Networks (DNN). Unsupervised Deep belief
networks (DBN) were used to initialize the DNN parameters as a preprocessing stage. The data
set was created using a packet generator and anomalies were injected by manipulating packets and
adding some Gaussian noise. Another deep learning technique, proposed by Taylor et al. [20],
used Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) recurrent neural network (RNN) to detect attacks on
the CAN bus. This approach works with raw data, unlike the reduced-data abstraction proposed
herein.
4) Sequential Techniques: Given the nature of our data, time-series anomaly detection tech-
niques seem like a natural approach. The Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a popular and powerful
tool for modeling and analyzing time-series data. HMMs have been widely used in different
applications, such as gene prediction [21], protein structure prediction [22], speech recognition
and weather forecasting. A fair amount of work was also done in time-series anomaly detection
in various research areas.
A Hidden Markov Model was used for monitoring patients’ health conditions, predicting future
clinical episodes and initiating alerting [23], [24]. An HMM was also applied to host-based
anomaly detection. Warrender et al. [25] compared the performance of four methods for modeling
normal program behavior and detecting intrusions based on system calls. They used several
techniques and showed that HMM achieved the best accuracy on average. In another paper, Hu
et al. [26] suggested an efficient HMM training scheme for system-call-based anomaly intrusion
detection.
A previous work, related to our approach, is [27], which proposed an anomaly detection method
based on HMM for the CAN bus raw data. However, this method was only tested against sudden
decrease/increase in speed and RPM anomalies.
Berlin et al. [28] introduced the idea of a Security Information and Event Management System
(SIEM) for connected vehicles located in the backend, but did not specify any concrete imple-
mentation. We will discuss the different deployment techniques for our solution, their tradeoffs
and the architecture we used in Section VI.
III. PROPOSED DETECTION TECHNIQUE
Having trained a Hidden Markov Model, it remains to specify how to identify anomalous
events based on the model likelihood score. Most commonly, a static threshold is used (either for
single observation or for sequences), and scores crossing the threshold are flagged as anomalous.
However, a static threshold can be inaccurate in many applications such as temporal data with
time- and history- sensitive characteristics.
We propose a different approach for identifying anomalous events using additional regression
model, based on work done in [10] on temporal anomaly detection in databases accesses. The
training set is divided into two parts P1, P2. The first part, P1, will be used to train the HMM
model, while the second part, P2, will be used to build a regressor that will predict the log-
Likelihood for time interval t. After the Hidden Markov Model was generated, we will build the
training set for the regression from P2 as described in Algorithm 1.
Upon receiving new event, we compare the event log-likelihood computed from the HMM
model to the the regression model predicted log-likelihood. When observing an abnormal value
with respect to the regression model wˆ, the system can issue an alert.
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Algorithm 1 BuildRegressor
Input: HMM model H , training set P2 = {(O11, . . . , O1n1), . . . , (Ok1 , . . . , Oknk)}
Output: Regression model wˆ
1: for j ← 1 to k do
2: for i← 1 to nj do
3: LLij ← getLogLikelihood(H, (Oj1, . . . , Oji ))
4: vij is a temporal feature vector created for the ith observation in the jth drive (e.g., time
since drive start, consecutive arrival times, etc.)
5: end for
6: end for
7: wˆ is built using least squares optimization problem:
wˆ ← argminw
k∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
(〈w, vij〉 − LLij)2
8: return wˆ
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Datasets
In order to collect large amount of data and simulate car fleets, we have built a small simulation
for connected vehicles. The simulator is based on the well known traffic simulator SUMO (Simu-
lation of Urban MObility) [29] which is widely used in different researches and projects. On top
of the simulations generated by SUMO, we have integrated a data collector for each vehicle. The
data sent to the backend consists of events that are collected and transmitted from each vehicle.
As discussed before, the use of events instead of raw data adds a layer of abstraction that helps
us filter noise and avoid protocol changes issues.
Event Definition: An event is a well-defined occurrence in the vehicle, generated by one of the
on-board security systems (in charge of collecting different sensors’ data and processing them into
events). Each event consists of event type (each type is associated with unique ID) and attributes.
Event types include login, logout, door open, door close, file access, running app, install app, app
update, USB inserted, network usage, etc. Each event contains different attributes. A file access
event contains attributes such as file type (root, protected and public), action (read, write and
execute), etc. An install app event contains source/destination packets, target IP, etc. The full list
of events and attributes is described in Appendix A.
Story Definition: drive can be described as a sequence of events sent from the vehicle to the
backend. We define a story as sequence of events that together describe a scenario. A drive is
therefore composed of stories.
In order to enrich the simulator and adapt it to connected vehicles, we have added the capability
to insert stories that describe communication of connected vehicles — new vehicles will login as
the drive starts and logout as drive ends. Therefore, we added login and logout stories. Connected
vehicles will also install and run various application in the background such as weather, GPS and
music. Thus, we added stories such as installing application, playing music (e.g., from stream,
USB and phone), GPS access, open flows (e.g., weather), open ports, etc. Another fundamental
feature of connected vehicles is the ability to download road maps while driving; therefore a
download map story was added. Moreover, since connected vehicles will need frequent firmware
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updates, Over The Air updates (OTA) and USB firmware updates stories were added. Appendix
B contains the full and detailed list of stories.
We have simulated a group of vehicles which carried out more than 4000 drives around the
city, where each drive consists of events occurred in the vehicle and sent to the backend.
B. Adding Noise
As we aim to test our implementation in as much realistic environment as possible, noise was
inserted into the data. We have randomly (yet in a logically consistent way) injected network usage,
open flows (weather and GPS applications communicating with servers), connected devices (Blue-
tooth communication, USB successful/unsuccessful insertions), open/closed ports, different file
accesses, drive cancellation (the driver entered the vehicle but exits before he starts driving, perhaps
because he forgot something outside) playing music during drive from USB/Bluetooth/Stream, etc.
C. Data Transformation
We tested two different transformation techniques for converting events to HMM suitable
training data.
1) EventID Transformation: As a baseline, and in order to examine whether rest of the features
improves/reduces the algorithm performance, the model is trained based only on the event IDs.
2) Discrete Transformation: This method takes the different event attributes and transforms the
event into a discrete feature vector using configurable ”buckets” (users will be able to define the
buckets size and limits). The main reason for defining an upper limit instead of finding the max
value in the data set is that it is possible for an attribute to reach an extremely high maximum value,
while most values are much lower; this could cause the majority of the values to be associated
with small group of buckets, and make the feature redundant.
For this experiments, we used the event ID, velocity, File Access options, open flows, vendor
type, etc. Velocity was split into 5 buckets (0-5, 5-10, 10-20, 20-50, 50+). Open flows was split
into 3 buckets (low, medium, high). File accesses were split according to the access type (read,
write and exe) and the file type (public, protected and root), vendor type was split into known
(white list) and unknown, etc.
D. Attack Scenarios
As described above, each drive could be described as a sequence of events sent from the vehicle
to the backend. An unknown sequence of events (such as missing events in a known sequence,
unrealistic order of events or even known sequence of events with attributes values that do not
jibe with normal behavior) could be a sign of suspicious activity. We can now describe several
different types of attack scenarios which could be tested in our the model.
• Out of order scenarios: testing out of order events that could indicate an abnormal behavior.
A simple example is the ”car entry” story:
{car unlock, door open, door close, seat belt on, alarm off, ignition}
Since ignition event cannot appear before we disable alarm, the following sequence of events
is not possible:
{car unlock, door open, door close, ignition, seat belt on, alarm off}
• USB firmware update attack: A more interesting example is a real exploit researchers
used to bypass the USB update key exchange mechanism. Cars firmware can be updated
using USB (as was done after the Chrysler’s hacking and recall [2], [3]) which contains
an authentication mechanism. Researchers [2] found out that if one takes the original USB,
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waits for the authentication process to finish, extracts the original USB and replaces it with
a malicious one, the malicious USB is authenticated and can access the car’s systems. This
vulnerability was not known before, and can cause severe damage. The process of normal
behavior can be described as a story:
{USB insert, Authentication Process, Running File From USB, File Access, USB Extract}
The following sequence of events can suggest that something is wrong and our system can
detect such behavior:
{USB insert, Authentication Process, USB removed, USB inserted, Running File From
USB, File Access, USB Extract}
• Communication with unknown vendor: one of the fundamental concepts of connected
cars is the ability to download road maps while driving. This can be very helpful when the
vehicle’s sensors which are responsible of monitoring the surrounding fail to do so. The
connected cars will communicate with known vendors while downloading the maps. An
attack could be communication with unknown vendor (e.g., malware inside the system trying
to disguise communication with C&C server), followed by abnormal network communication
and/or unknown processes running in the background.
• OTA malicious updates: as the USB firmware updates, OTA will also be available in
connected cars. A malicious update caused by attackers could cause the installation of new
applications, abnormal network communication, etc.
• Malicious application installation: there is wide variety of ways to make a user install a
malicious application. One of those ways is to upload a benign version to the store, and after
the application is installed, it updates itself with the malicious content and/or tricks the user
into granting it with high privileges. This could change the application normal behavior and
cause sudden drift in file accesses, attempt to access OS or CAN infrastructure, abnormal
network communication, etc.
E. HMM Model Generation
We have built various HMM models with different number of hidden states. Then, we calculated
each model’s log-likelihood on a test set with K = 3 folds cross validation. After comparing the
different models, our algorithm chose the model with the best log-likelihood.
F. Tests
In the following experiments, our focus was on two main goals:
• Test the developed algorithms and system architecture.
• Analyze the dynamic temporal threshold performances.
We have tested HMM models with different number of hidden states both for the EventID
transformation and the Discrete transformation. Models were tested against test set with 1000
different benign and anomalous drives. In order to generate anomalous drives, we have injected
multiple variations of the anomalies types described in IV-D into benign drives.
The experiments were conducted in both offline and online modes: full drives (offline) and
drive prefixes (online).
Offline mode: When testing full drives, the system waits until the driver has stopped the vehicle
and logged out, then it pulls the full sequence of events occurred during the drive (and were stored
in the backend) and test it against the vehicle’s HMM and regression models.
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Fig. 1: eventID transformation using 5 hidden
states
Fig. 2: Discrete transformation using 5 hidden
states
Fig. 3: eventID transformation using 15 hidden
states
Fig. 4: Discrete transformation using 15 hidden
states
TABLE I: AUC results under given transformation technique, detection method and number of
hidden states of the HMM
Hidden States Number
Transformation Detection technique 5 15 20 30
EventID Threshold 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.93
EventID Regression 0.94 0.89 0.94 0.96
Discrete Threshold 0.78 0.84 0.88 0.92
Discrete Regression 0.81 0.9 0.92 0.96
Online mode: In drive prefixes mode, the system tests each new event as soon as it is sent
from the vehicle, and alerts when the accumulated prefix of events is identified as anomalous.
To achieve the second goal and evaluate the dynamic temporal threshold performances, we
performed the same tests both on static thresholds and on our dynamic temporal threshold.
Since the ROC-AUC and F-Measure are generally insensitive to the imbalance nature of the
data, they were chosen to compare the results between different models with different hidden
states, and between the two transformation techniques. ROC curves are presented in Figures 1
to 8 and summarized in Table I. F-Measure results are presented in Figures 9, 10 and summarized
in Tables II, III.
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Fig. 5: eventID transformation using 20 hidden
states
Fig. 6: Discrete transformation using 20 hidden
states
Fig. 7: EventID transformation using 30 hidden
states
Fig. 8: Discrete transformation using 30 hidden
states
Offline comparison Online comparison
Fig. 9: EventID transformation F-Measure results
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Offline comparison Online comparison
Fig. 10: Discrete transformation F-Measure results
TABLE II: F-Measure results with EventID transformation
Hidden States Number
Offline/Online Detection technique 5 15 20 30
Offline Avg. Threshold 0.74 0.67 0.74 0.77
Offline Min. Threshold 0.8 0.71 0.74 0.78
Offline Regression 0.89 0.84 0.88 0.9
Online Avg. Threshold 0.75 0.63 0.67 0.88
Online Min. Threshold 0.67 0.62 0.64 0.88
Online Regression 0.92 0.72 0.83 0.93
TABLE III: F-Measure results with Discrete transformation
Hidden States Number
Offline/Online Detection technique 5 15 20 30
Offline Avg. Threshold 0.58 0.59 0.72 0.75
Offline Min. Threshold 0.62 0.62 0.83 0.76
Offline Regression 0.63 0.65 0.83 0.78
Online Avg. Threshold 0.39 0.39 0.84 0.53
Online Min. Threshold 0.33 0.36 0.86 0.59
Online Regression 0.61 0.61 0.86 0.71
V. RESULTS
As it can be observed from the graphs, both transformation techniques reached high AUC of
0.96. The eventID transformation reached F-Measure higher than 0.9 both in offline and online
mode. The Discrete transformation reached F-Measure of 0.83 in offline mode, and 0.86 in online
mode.
Although the F-Measure is higher for the eventID transformation, the Discrete transformation
advantage lays with its ability to identify anomalies that could not be identified with the eventID
transformation such as: application accessing files not permitted for it, unusual behavior in different
contexts (events that are legit only in specific speeds/flows/files context), etc.
Best results were achieved indisputably by using the regression model temporal threshold. The
regression model was superior to any static threshold in all tests, detection modes and model
measurement methods.
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Fig. 11: High Level System Architecture
VI. DEPLOYMENT
There are two main approaches for deploying our solution: on-board or on the backend. Those
approaches present a trade-off between several aspects including detection latency, detection scale,
footprint (resources) and bandwidth consumption.
The on-board architecture will provide real time anomaly detection due to the fast communica-
tion between the data collector and the detection engine. However, this method is resource-intensive
on the edge units. Furthermore, it is far more challenging to serve car fleets and detect cross fleet
anomalies using this architecture. On the other hand, in the backend architecture, serving car
fleets and detecting cross fleet anomalies is much easier, but there is certain latency in the data
transmitted from vehicles to the cloud. Moreover, this approach requires enormous bandwidth.
Our solution had to overcome two major challenges:
1) Apply real time anomaly detection using HMM using overcoming the low computational
power and limited memory resources.
2) Detect anomalies in real time for a car fleet.
Therefore, we chose to use a hybrid approach (known approach in the industry), where a rule
based client (the data collector) is integrated into the vehicle and sends events to the backend.
However, as vehicles evolve, computational power and memory resources limitations will not be
an obstacle anymore and this solution could be integrated fully inside the vehicle.
In order to address those challenges we suggest a hybrid platform with HMM anomaly detection
mechanism:
By moving the detection mechanism to the cloud, we can overcome the low computational
power and limited memory resources of the vehicle. However, transmitting raw CAN/OS/Network
packets to the cloud will require enormous bandwidth, high transmission rate and can overwhelm
the backend. Therefore, we suggest to use a light-weight component that could be integrated into
the vehicle and will be able to extract important data based on configurable rules, and transmit it
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back to the backend with all the selected features, which means our data will not be raw packets,
rather it would be in a higher level of abstraction and include only relevant data extracted from
applications, network traffic, chosen sensors, CAN bus, etc.
The backend will store Hidden Markov Models learned for a large number of vehicles. By
using a cloud-based platform we can serve car fleets and possibly apply advanced analytics
for identifying correlations between vehicles and identify in-progress attacks on vehicles using
anomalies detected from other vehicles. Using this approach, we can either train an Hidden Markov
Model for each car and store it in a distributed database, or build a model for groups of cars with
common characteristics using clustering based techniques. Figure 11 describes the system’s high
level architecture.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work has introduced a full working HMM solution for connected cars cyber security
with a unique approach handling the vehicle’s collected data and a new temporal based detection
technique. For each vehicle in the fleet, important data is collected using rule based engine. The
collected data is tested (either in offline or online) against an HMM model trained on the vehicle’s
normal behavior. In the search for a smart detection technique, we built a regression model based
on temporal features (e.g., time since drive start,consecutive arrival times,etc.) which predicted
the expected Log-Likelihood at time t and compared the result with the actual Log-Likelihood.
Although the system performed very well even with static thresholds, the temporal detection
technique proved its superiority and provided significantly improved results.
Our system monitors not only the CAN bus, but rather monitors different vehicle’s interfaces
(OS, Network and CAN), and was proven to be highly capable to detect real life complicated
anomalies which involves wide number of features from the different interfaces.
The deployment method we used to implement our solution is capable of monitoring car fleets.
Furthermore, it allows us to train HMMs either for individuals or for groups of cars with common
characteristics using a clustering preprocessing stage.
This work can serve as a basis for applying advanced analytics for identifying correlations
between vehicles as well as in-progress attacks on vehicles using anomalies detected from other
vehicles.
REFERENCES
[1] K. Koscher, A. Czeskis, F. Roesner, S. Patel, T. Kohno, S. Checkoway, D. McCoy, B. Kantor, D. Anderson,
H. Shacham et al., “Experimental security analysis of a modern automobile,” in Security and Privacy (SP), 2010
IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2010, pp. 447–462.
[2] C. Miller and C. Valasek, “Remote exploitation of an unaltered passenger vehicle,” Black Hat USA, vol. 2015, 2015.
[3] A. Greenberg. (2015) Hackers remotely kill a jeep on the highway. [Online]. Available: https://www.wired.com/
2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/
[4] S. Checkoway, D. McCoy, B. Kantor, D. Anderson, H. Shacham, S. Savage, K. Koscher, A. Czeskis, F. Roesner,
T. Kohno et al., “Comprehensive experimental analyses of automotive attack surfaces.” in USENIX Security
Symposium. San Francisco, 2011.
[5] R. M. Ishtiaq Roufa, H. Mustafaa, S. O. Travis Taylora, W. Xua, M. Gruteserb, W. Trappeb, and I. Seskarb, “Security
and privacy vulnerabilities of in-car wireless networks: A tire pressure monitoring system case study,” in 19th USENIX
Security Symposium, Washington DC, 2010, pp. 11–13.
[6] A. Francillon, B. Danev, and S. Capkun, “Relay attacks on passive keyless entry and start systems in modern cars,” in
IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 18TH ANNUAL NETWORK AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM SECURITY SYMPOSIUM.
THE INTERNET SOCIETY. Citeseer, 2011.
[7] R. N. Charette, “This car runs on code,” IEEE spectrum, vol. 46, no. 3, p. 3, 2009.
[8] D. K. Nilsson, U. E. Larson, and E. Jonsson, “Efficient in-vehicle delayed data authentication based on compound
message authentication codes,” in Vehicular Technology Conference, 2008. VTC 2008-Fall. IEEE 68th. IEEE, 2008,
pp. 1–5.
[9] F. Hartwich et al., “Can with flexible data-rate,” in Proc. iCC, 2012, pp. 1–9.
12
[10] E. Gutflaish, A. Kontorovich, S. Sabato, O. Biller, and O. Sofer, “Temporal anomaly detection: calibrating the
surprise,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.10085, 2017.
[11] H. M. Song, H. R. Kim, and H. K. Kim, “Intrusion detection system based on the analysis of time intervals of can
messages for in-vehicle network,” in Information Networking (ICOIN), 2016 International Conference on. IEEE,
2016, pp. 63–68.
[12] K.-T. Cho and K. G. Shin, “Fingerprinting electronic control units for vehicle intrusion detection.” in USENIX
Security Symposium, 2016, pp. 911–927.
[13] M. Mu¨ter and N. Asaj, “Entropy-based anomaly detection for in-vehicle networks,” in Intelligent Vehicles Symposium
(IV), 2011 IEEE. IEEE, 2011, pp. 1110–1115.
[14] M. Marchetti, D. Stabili, A. Guido, and M. Colajanni, “Evaluation of anomaly detection for in-vehicle networks
through information-theoretic algorithms,” in Research and Technologies for Society and Industry Leveraging a better
tomorrow (RTSI), 2016 IEEE 2nd International Forum on. IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–6.
[15] M. L. Han, J. Lee, A. R. Kang, S. Kang, J. K. Park, and H. K. Kim, “A statistical-based anomaly detection method
for connected cars in internet of things environment,” in International Conference on Internet of Vehicles. Springer,
2015, pp. 89–97.
[16] V. Chandola, A. Banerjee, and V. Kumar, “Anomaly detection: A survey,” ACM computing surveys (CSUR), vol. 41,
no. 3, p. 15, 2009.
[17] A. Theissler, “Anomaly detection in recordings from in-vehicle net-works,” BIG DATA AND APPLICATIONS, p. 23,
2014.
[18] L. Li, R. J. Hansman, R. Palacios, and R. Welsch, “Anomaly detection via a gaussian mixture model for flight
operation and safety monitoring,” Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, vol. 64, pp. 45–57,
2016.
[19] M.-J. Kang and J.-W. Kang, “Intrusion detection system using deep neural network for in-vehicle network security,”
PloS one, vol. 11, no. 6, p. e0155781, 2016.
[20] A. Taylor, S. Leblanc, and N. Japkowicz, “Anomaly detection in automobile control network data with long short-
term memory networks,” in Data Science and Advanced Analytics (DSAA), 2016 IEEE International Conference on.
IEEE, 2016, pp. 130–139.
[21] M. Stanke and S. Waack, “Gene prediction with a hidden markov model and a new intron submodel,” Bioinformatics,
vol. 19, no. suppl 2, pp. ii215–ii225, 2003.
[22] V. De Fonzo, F. Aluffi-Pentini, and V. Parisi, “Hidden markov models in bioinformatics,” Current Bioinformatics,
vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 49–61, 2007.
[23] P. Jiang, J. Winkley, C. Zhao, R. Munnoch, G. Min, and L. T. Yang, “An intelligent information forwarder for
healthcare big data systems with distributed wearable sensors,” IEEE systems journal, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 1147–1159,
2016.
[24] A. R. M. Forkan and I. Khalil, “Peace-home: Probabilistic estimation of abnormal clinical events using vital sign
correlations for reliable home-based monitoring,” Pervasive and Mobile Computing, 2017.
[25] C. Warrender, S. Forrest, and B. Pearlmutter, “Detecting intrusions using system calls: Alternative data models,” in
Security and Privacy, 1999. Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 1999, pp. 133–145.
[26] J. Hu, X. Yu, D. Qiu, and H.-H. Chen, “A simple and efficient hidden markov model scheme for host-based anomaly
intrusion detection,” IEEE network, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 42–47, 2009.
[27] S. N. Narayanan, S. Mittal, and A. Joshi, “Obd securealert: An anomaly detection system for vehicles,” in Smart
Computing (SMARTCOMP), 2016 IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–6.
[28] O. Berlin, A. Held, M. Matousek, and F. Kargl, “Poster: Anomaly-based misbehaviour detection in connected car
backends,” in Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC), 2016 IEEE. IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–2.
[29] D. Krajzewicz, J. Erdmann, M. Behrisch, and L. Bieker, “Recent development and applications of SUMO - Simulation
of Urban MObility,” International Journal On Advances in Systems and Measurements, vol. 5, no. 3&4, pp. 128–138,
December 2012.
APPENDIX A
EVENTS LIST
TABLE IV: Event types and their attributes
Event type Attributes
Login location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Door Unlocked location, velocity
Door Opened location, velocity
Door Closed location, velocity
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Fasten Seatbelt location, velocity
Alarm Disarming location, velocity
Ignition location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Release Seatbelt location, velocity
Engine Stop location, velocity
Door Locked location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Alarm Arming location, velocity
Logout location, velocity,
source/destination packets
USB insert location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Authentication Pro-
cess
location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Running Exe File
From USB
location, velocity,
source/destination packets,
file type
USB Extract location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Running App location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Open Flows location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Download App location, velocity,
source/destination packets,
app name, path
List Of New Exec
On The ECU
location, velocity,
source/destination packets,
app name, path
Network Usage location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Abnormal CAN be-
havior
location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Abnormal NW be-
havior
location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Abnormal OS behav-
ior
location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Main Router Login location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Start Download
Firmware updates
location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Finish Download
Firmware updates
location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Request Update location, velocity,
source/destination packets
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Start firmware Up-
date
location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Finish firmware Up-
date
location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Main Router Logout location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Beacons location, velocity,
source/destination packets
OEM Communica-
tion
location, velocity,
source/destination packets,
OEM name
File Access location, velocity,
source/destination packets,
file type, access type
Change In Data File
Size
location, velocity,
source/destination packets,
file type, path
Map Process Started location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Loading Map location, velocity,
source/destination packets,
path
Unknown Process
Started
location, velocity,
source/destination packets,
path
Unknown Vendor
Communication
location, velocity,
source/destination packets,
vendor name
GPS Access location, velocity,
source/destination packets
Open Ports location, velocity,
source/destination packets,
ports list
Bluetooth Device
Connected
location, velocity,
source/destination packets,
device id
Bluetooth Device
Disconnected
location, velocity,
source/destination packets,
device id
APPENDIX B
STORIES
As described above, each story is a sequence of events (attributes could be changed in the
different simulations and therefore we will specify only the important ones).
Car Entry 1: Door Unlocked, Door Opened, Door Closed, Fasten Seatbelt, Alarm Disarming,
Ignition, Login
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Car Entry 2: Door Unlocked, Door Opened, Door Closed, Login, Fasten Seatbelt, Release
Seatbelt, Door Opened, Door Closed, Fasten Seatbelt, Alarm Disarming, Ignition
Car Exit: Engine Stop, Release Seatbelt, Door Opened, Door Closed, Door Locked, Alarm
Arming, Logout
Drive Cancellation 1: Door Unlocked, Door Opened, Door Closed, Door Locked
Drive Cancellation 2: Door Unlocked, Door Opened, Door Closed, Alarm Disarming, Door
Opened, Door Closed, Door Locked, Alarm Arming
Info System Upgrade: USB insert, Authentication Process, Running Exe File From USB, File
Access , USB Extract
OTA Update: Main Router Login, Start Download FW, Finish Download FW, Request Update,
Start FW Update, Finish FW Update, Main Router Logout
Play Music: Running App, Open flows, Network usage
Install App: Open Flows, Download App, File access, Running App,List Of New Executables
On The ECU
Download Map: OEM Communication, File Access, Change In Data File Size, Map Process
Started, Loading Map
Music From USB 1: USB Insert, File Access, USB Extract (the last event occurs at random
time after file access)
Music From USB 2: 1. USB Insert, USB Extract, USB Insert, File Access, USB Extract (the
last event occurs at random time after file access)
Music From USB 3: USB Insert, USB Extract, USB Insert, USB Extract (the last event occurs
at random time after file access)
Music From mobile: Bluetooth Device Connected, File Access, Bluetooth Device Disconnected
(the last event occurs at random time after file access)
Connected Device - Mobile: Bluetooth Device Connected (id: known/unknown id)
Open flows – GPS application: Open Flows (TargetIP: 130.211.9.172. Priority: low(2))
Open flows – Weather application: Open Flows (TargetIP: 46.228.47.115. Priority: low(2))
GPS: GPS access
Open Ports: Open Ports
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